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Abstract
Does electing Islamist parties help or hurt women? Due to Ennahda winning a plurality in the
2011 elections and women obtaining 31% of seats, Tunisia offers an opportunity to test the
impact of legislator gender and Islamist orientation on women’s representation. Using original
2012 surveys of 40 Tunisian parliamentarians (MPs) and 1,200 citizens, we find that electing
female and Islamists MPs of both genders improves women’s symbolic and service
responsiveness by increasing the likelihood that women are aware of and contact MPs. Electing
Islamist female MPs has a positive impact on women’s symbolic and service responsiveness, but
decreases the likelihood that men will interact with legislators. We argue that Islamist deputies
are more responsive to women due to an Islamic mandate effect—that is, Islamist parties’ efforts
to institutionalize their constituency relations, provide services to the marginalized through direct
contact, and respect norms of piety by using female parliamentarians to reach women in sexsegregated spaces. While Islamist parties positively impact some aspects of women’s
representation, they also reinforce traditional understandings of gender relations. Our results
extend literature on Islam, gender, and governance by demonstrating that quotas and party
institutionalization improve women’s representation in clientelistic contexts.

Keywords: Service provision, symbolic responsiveness, gender equality, women and politics,
Islamist parties, Middle East and North Africa, Muslim world
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When it comes to political participation, women face an uphill battle in Arab and Muslim
countries. Key obstacles include promoting women’s rights in authoritarian parliaments
(Shalaby, 2016) and accessing constituency service (Benstead, 2016; 2019b). Yet, the rise of
women’s descriptive representation in Arab legislatures, from less than 5% of seats in 2000 to
almost 20% in 2020 (IPU, 2020), and the electoral success of Islamist parties in places like
Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, raise an important question: When it comes to
service and symbolic responsiveness, does electing more women and Islamist parties help or hurt
women? 1
Existing literature shows women are marginalized from political networks in clientelistic
settings (Beck, 2003; Tripp, 2001) and, as a result, face barriers to elected office (Bjarnegård,
2013) and constituency service. Surveys of Moroccan and Algerian parliamentarians and
Tunisian and Libyan citizens find that women are significantly less able to request clientelistic
services from legislators, but that electing women, especially through quotas, improves their
access (Benstead, 2016; 2019b).
Despite the growing role of Islamist parties and studies of how these movements impact
legislation on gender issues (Kang, 2015), little is known about how they shape women’s ability
to ask for services and interact with elected and appointed officials. Conventional wisdom
suggests that Islamist successes negatively affect women, and, thus, some pundits see the Arab
spring’s Islamist victories as a winter for women (Barchrach, 2011). Yet, literature on Islamist
parties and governance indicates that Islamist parties improve governance outcomes, such
healthcare, for women (Blaydes, 2014), due in part to their efforts to institutionalize service
1

We define Islamist parties as those whose ideology is rooted in Islam, and who participate in

elections.
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provision and reach out to groups that are marginalized from existing patronage networks
(Cammett and Jones Luong, 2014). Gender and politics research argues that the chief obstacle to
women’s advancement may be clientelistic politics, which advantages men, due to their
numerical dominance in politics and tendency toward homosocial networks (Sung, 2003;
Bjarnegård, 2013). 2 It follows that if Islamist parties seek to bypass existing patronage networks
and serve all citizens fairly, then this would benefit marginalized groups, including women, in
areas such as service and symbolic responsiveness.
Briefly, service responsiveness, or clientelistic responsiveness, involves providing
services, such as healthcare, electricity, or jobs (Benstead, 2016). Symbolic responsiveness
includes different modes of interaction with constituents (Eulau and Karps, 1977), which may
build trust and facilitate service, allocation (i.e., club goods), and policy (i.e., legislative)
responsiveness. 3 Increased connections and interaction between elected officials and women also
creates channels to bring women’s concerns into the policymaking sphere (Arat, 2005; p. 113).
2

Clientelism: an “informal relationship between two actors of asymmetrical socioeconomic

power where the patron…controls…resources…clients pursue but often cannot receive
otherwise” (Manzetti and Wilson, 2007; p. 953). See Benstead (2016) for a discussion of the
distinction between clientelistic responsiveness in a non-democracy and casework in a
democracy.
3

Pitkin (1967) conceptualized representation as responsiveness, while Eulau and Karps (1977)

identified four dimensions of responsiveness: symbolic, service, policy, and allocation (i.e.,
district projects) responsiveness. The dimensions of responsiveness overlap (Schwindt-Bayer and
Mishler, 2005), forming a seamless process of responsiveness to citizens’ needs (Celis, Childs,
Kantola, & Krook, 2008).
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In this paper, we argue that Islamist parties improve some aspects of responsiveness to
women due to their institutionalization and strategic use of women. Focusing on service and
symbolic responsiveness, we maintain that because Islamist parties serve a broad cross-section of
society, including marginalized communities and women, and institutionalize constituency
service to avoid corruption and patronage, electing Islamists improves service and symbolic
representation of women. This would be particularly true if Islamist parties leverage their female
members to mobilize female voters in segregated environments such as homes, mosques, and
weddings. Such a positive effect would be counterintuitive, given conventional wisdom with
regard to the impact of Islam on women’s status, but the hypothesis is untested. This is largely
because of the limited number of countries in which a sufficiently large number of female
Islamist deputies have been elected and the lack of surveys asking about parliamentarian-citizens
interactions.
To test the impact of MP gender and party orientation on symbolic and service
responsiveness to women, this paper takes advantage of increased Islamist and female
representation following Tunisia’s Constituent Assembly elections in which women gained 31%
of seats due to a legislated quota and Ennahda won 37% of all seats. We argue that Islamist and
Islamist female deputies provide greater symbolic and service responsiveness to women due to
an Islamic mandate effect—that is, Islamist parties’ efforts to institutionalize their constituency
relations, provide services fairly to citizens of all backgrounds, and respect norms of piety and
sex segregation by using female parliamentarians to reach women in segregated spaces. The
evidence shows that both female MP gender as well as MP Islamist party orientation are directly
associated with a higher likelihood that female citizens will know a deputy’s name and have
asked for a service. Yet Islamist female deputies are also associated with an increased likelihood
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of female citizens interacting with deputies while decreasing the extent to which male citizens do
so. 4
Our study is novel in that it is the first to examine the intersectional effect of
parliamentarian gender and Islamist party identification on women’s responsiveness and one of
few to examine symbolic responsiveness to women in developing countries. It contributes to the
gender and clientelism literature by showing that electing more women supports better
governance by diminishing male advantages in accessing patronage (Sung, 2003). Islamist
parties do not promote liberal gender equality and are unlikely to engage in substantive
representation of secularly progressive women’s issues in the legislature. Indeed, Islamist parties
use female members to mobilize women voters in sex-segregated religious contexts, reinforcing
conservative gender norms. Yet the data suggest that Islamist movements support responsiveness
to women through their efforts to serve citizens regardless of their background and strategic use
of women to reach out to female citizens in social contexts in which female citizens feel
comfortable making requests.
Our findings with regard to Islamist parties are likely to be broadly applicable to
clientelistic societies in the Arab and Muslim world, wherever marginalized populations increase
their representation and parties adopt democratically-oriented practices in areas such as service
provision. 5 And, the impact of electing women is likely to impact women’s representation in a
4

The measure of service provision taps whether citizens have asked for help, not whether the

service was actually received.
5

Effects may not generalize where Islamist parties establish authoritarian, theocratic

government. Our conclusions do not predict how Ennahda's 2016 move to separate itself from
social and religious activities will impact women.
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broader swath of countries, given male advantages accessing patronage networks in Africa
(Tripp, 2001), Asia (Bjarnegård, 2013), and the Middle East (Benstead, 2016; 2019b). Because
Tunisia is the most gender-equal Arab societies (Charrad, 2001), we expect the impact of
electing women and Islamists to have a greater impact in other Arab societies, especially in
highly gender segregated settings like the Arab Gulf countries. 6

The Tunisian Case
Members of parliament across the region’s authoritarian and transitional regimes devote
considerable time to service provision (Abdel-Samad, 2009; Benstead, 2016). In this respect,
Tunisia’s transitional period is representative of other periods in Tunisian history and of other
Arab countries (Blaydes, 2010; Lust, 2009). The role of the Constituent Assembly, which held
office from 2011-2013, was to develop, debate, and pass the constitution and to govern
(Delmasso & Cavatorta, 2013). However, based on the survey of Tunisian Constituent Assembly
members discussed below, 63% indicated that they responded to a minimum of 11-50 service
requests per month. This is similar to service provision rates in other Arab countries. Benstead
(2008) found Moroccan parliamentarians provided an average of 98 constituency services per
month, while Algerian deputies provided 44. Moreover, gender gaps in access to
parliamentarians exist not only in Tunisia, as discussed below, but also in Jordan, Libya, and
Algeria.
Moreover, since electing Islamists and women is likely to have the greatest impact on
responsiveness to females in the most patriarchal and clientelistic settings, Tunisia is a most
6

Indeed, Benstead shows that Islamist parties than non-Islamist parties are more responsive to

female citizens in Morocco (2021) and Algeria (2020).
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difficult case in the Arab world, due to its history of state policies to ensure gender equality and
relatively more democratic politics. Tunisia’s founding prime minister (and later president)
Habib Bourguiba passed by decree a Personal Status Code (PSC) in 1956 that extended many
rights to women, including to outlaw polygamy and the guardian system, grant women an equal
right to divorce, and give Tunisia the most progressive family law in the Arab world at the time.
The PSC fueled social changes that altered women’s political and economic status, including in
civil society, which helped to spark and sustain the Arab spring. Today, Tunisian women enjoy
among the region’s highest levels of political representation and labor force participation
(Benstead, 2019a).
In 2004, Ben Ali’s Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) implemented a 25% party
quota in national, regional, and municipal legislative elections, increasing its parliamentary quota
to 30% in 2009. On the eve of the revolution, 28% of the parliament was female due to RCD
dominance in Tunisia’s heavily controlled elections. Elections, held on October 23, 2011 by
proportional representation in 24 districts, were widely viewed as clean (Benstead, Kao, & Lust,
2022). While Ennahda was the main winner, its 37% of seats were not sufficient to rule alone.
Instead, it formed a troika (coalition) with two non-Islamist parties, the Congress for the
Republic and Ettakatol (Willis, 2014; Buehler, 2018; Nugent, 2020).
Yet, Ennahda elected more women than any other party, due in part to the type of quota
in place for parliamentary elections. In 2011, a legislated quota was implemented which required
party lists in the country’s proportional representation system to alternate between male and
female candidates (that is, a vertical zipper system). Yet without provisions regarding the gender
of the first candidate on the list (that is, a horizontal zipper system), most parties chose men to
head their party lists. As a result, parties that won two seats in many districts–namely Ennahda–
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elected most women. While women won 31% in the 2011 Constituent Assembly (67 of 217
seats), 61% of all female legislators in Tunisia represented Ennahda.
Accordingly, the Assembly was made up as follows: Non-Islamist men (48%), Islamist
men (21%), Islamist women (19%), and non-Islamist women (11%). (Table 1).

[Table 1]

Table 1. Parliamentarians in Constituent Assembly
Constituent Assembly members
Islamist men
45(21%)
Islamist women
41(19%)
Non-Islamist men
105(48%)
Non-Islamist women
26(11%)
Total seats
217(100%)
Table 1 shows the seats held by the four intersecting identity categories.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
We expect the strong showing for female candidates in the elections to positively impact
women’s service and symbolic representation. Existing literature suggests strongly that female
citizens are marginalized from clientelistic networks, but that elected female officials helps to
narrow this gap. 7 Bjarnegård (2013) argues that clientelistic politics are inherently unequal

7

Extant research suggests that while women are marginalized from patronage networks in the

formal political sphere in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (Beck, 2003; Tripp, 2001)—e.g.,
women made 20-29% of requests to Moroccan and Algerian parliamentarians—electing women
improves women’s ability to ask for services (Benstead, 2016). Benstead (2019) found that
women were more likely than men to contact female parliamentarians in transitional Libya,
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because women face disadvantages accumulating homosocial capital—close relationships with
individuals, often of the same gender, who are similar and have resources needed for electoral
success. Homosocial capital includes expressive and instrumental resources (Bjarnegård, 2013).
Expressive resources are relational similarities (e.g., ease of relating), which stem from
traditional norms defining public space as male and private space as female (Sadiqi, 2008) and
encourage sex segregation. Instrumental resources are those needed to reach goals, such as
winning office or attracting patronage. Expressive and instrumental factors on the supply and
demand side diminish women’s access to services whenever men are dominant.
Yet the literature has less to say about how electing Islamist parties–at the intersection of
MP gender–shapes responsiveness to female citizens. Conventional wisdom and many scholars
expect Islamist movements will erode women’s rights because they adhere to and reinforce
conservative gender norms (Norris and Inglehart, 2001). Since most Islamist parties want to
implement Shari’a, it is reasonable to expect that Islamist governments will negatively impact
women’s status. Islamist parties may incorporate women’s rights into their platforms, but they
are unlikely to genuinely promote gender equality (Clark & Schwedler, 2003).

where women contact female deputies 17% of the time, compared to men, who never reported
seeking assistance from a female member (p<.05). In Jordan, men and women are equally likely
to ask a female for help. This may be due to tribes’ political influence, which improves women’s
service responsiveness because women can leverage an intersecting identity (i.e., co-ethnicity) to
access services (Benstead, 2015). The same was true for Tunisia, where citizens more often
contacted same-gendered local councilors, particularly when making large requests for club
goods, which require a close relationship (Benstead, 2019).
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Yet, other researchers find Islamist parties positively impact governance. Meyersson
(2014) concludes that the Refah (Welfare) party in Turkey, which won several mayoral elections,
improved poor women’s access to education. Henderson and Kuncoro (2011) found that Islamist
parties decreased corruption (Henderson & Kuncoro, 2011), while Blaydes (2014) showed that
women living in Egyptian localities controlled by radical Islamists experienced better health
outcomes. For example, Benstead (2021) found that local and national legislators from Islamist
parties in Algeria were more likely than legislators from other parties to serve citizens with
whom they did not have a personal relationship and to serve women.
Existing literature suggests that Islamist parties are more fully institutionalized than other
non-Islamist parties, allowing them to mobilize and serve citizens at the grassroots, including
marginalized citizens who lack access to patronage networks with the state (Cammett & Jones
Luong, 2014). To implement their party strategy, Islamist, more than other parties,
institutionalize service provision by establishing direct contact with citizens through a network of
party and local offices, mosques, social service institutions, and schools (Roháč, 2013; p. 256;
Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008). This means that they work together, often in party offices where male
and female elected officials and staff are present. Direct contact with constituents and this team
approach allows Islamist women to interact with female citizens who are practicing Muslims and
may be reluctant to approach male legislators (Benstead, 2021). The direct contact also allows
women to talk to someone who understands the obstacles they face, which in turn allows female
legislators to respond at least symbolically to their needs.
In doing so, Islamists utilize face-to-face connections with constituents to bolster party
rather than personal reputation (Wickham, 2002; Clark, 2004b; Arat, 2005; Yadav, 2010).
Benstead (2008) found that Islamist deputies in Morocco and Algeria, when asked to rate their
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perceived representative role on a spectrum from personal to party-oriented, were more likely to
rate their approach as party-centered. In Morocco, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is personal
reputation and 5 is the party reputation, non-Islamists scored 3.2 on average, while Islamists
scored 1.6 (p<.001). In Algeria, the difference was smaller—3.0 for non-Islamists and 2.8 for
Islamists (p<.05).
Islamist parties are also overtly focused on serving the needs of constituents, whether
than those in the middle classes (Brooke, 2019) or the needy (Bayat, 2002; Catusse & Zaki,
2009; Ismail, 2001; Troudi, 2011; Walsh, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2002). Islamist parties stress
fairness and social responsibility as part of their religious ideology. This clearly distinguishes
their efforts from the practices of authoritarian regimes in which they operate (Brumberg, 2002;
Esposito, 1999; Wickham, 2002) and opens opportunities for women and members of other
marginalized groups to interact with and access services from deputies.
Some theorists claim this constitutes an exchange of favors for votes (Alterman, 2000;
Flanigan, 2008; Hamzeh, 2001). Yet Clark (2004b) argues that these activities are different from
the traditional clientelistic networks because they are based on “horizontal networks” between
group members working toward a common goal: to provide services to citizens in order to
promote the party’s goals (Roháč, 2013; p. 267). Islamist parties’ commitment to fairness and
their ability to engage easily in direct contact with observant Muslim women encourages female
Islamists legislators to respond to the symbolic and service needs of women in their
constituencies.
Cammett and Jones Luong (2014) argue that organizational capacity, social service
provision, and ideological values are all elements of the party’s reputation and, as such, party
reputation is the most important driver of Islamist electoral success (Cammett & Jones Luong,
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2014). For Islamist parties to remain credible and have a reputation for delivering public goods,
they must offer services to all people, including women.
Accordingly, we posit that Islamist parties will improve symbolic and service
responsiveness of women due to an Islamic mandate effect. We adapt this term from Franceschet
and Piscopo (2008), who argued that quota-elected women perceive a mandate, or “obligation to
act on behalf of women,” due to their underrepresentation (p. 394-395).
Our concept of an Islamic mandate has two components, one stemming from the party’s
institutionalization of service provision which impacts its capacity to reach and serve citizens
from different backgrounds (i.e., the party component), and the other from its strategic use of
female leaders to reach women specifically, often in sex-segretgated environments (i.e., the
gendered-component). We argue that Islamist parties’ efforts to institutionalize their
constituency relations, provide services to the marginalized through direct contact, and respect
norms of piety by using female parliamentarians to reach women, resulting in greater symbolic
and service responsiveness to female citzens.
Accordingly, while Islamist parties are not the only ones to utilize female members or
have women’s sections, they do so in distinctive ways (Arat, 2005; Ayata, 1996). Because of
their commitment to Islamic values of piety, Islamist parties see the importance of engaging
female members in order to mobilize women. Female members not only reach out to voters, but
they also establish new social networks (Clark, 2004a) by meeting women who are not engaged
in political networks through social functions like homes, weddings, and social teas (Arat, 2005;
Blaydes & Tarouty, 2009). By emphasizing piety, Islamist parties create “sacred” spaces that
ensure that women can safely enter political offices and participate in meetings while being free
from harassment and negative impacts on their reputation. Islamist parties in several countries
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utilize quotas to increase the number of women not only on party lists, but also within their
organization (Clark & Schweder, 2003) and often have women’s sections in their party offices
and women’s committees (White, 2002). Crucially, these events allow female Islamist legislators
to interact with female constituents. When women constituents are in a separate space, they feel
more at ease to engage with female legislators in the absence of patriarchal hierarchy. This is
well known in the case of Morocco where religious da’wa groups like Tawhid was Islah, the
social movement of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) have women’s meetings like
prayer groups meant to serve the needs of women, both in terms of religious instruction and
service provision (Wegner & Pellicer, 2009; Clark, 2004a).
This grassroots character of Islamist parties—and their female membership—
characterized other countries as well. In interviews with Moroccan constituents, Benstead (2021)
found that citizens had more day-to-day contact with Islamist Party of Justice and Development
(PJD) in Tangiers, than with deputies representing other parties in the city. White (2002) also
found this to be the case in Turkey,
Secularist activists in Ümraniye used strategies of organization similar to those of the
Islamists to mobilize residents…But while they were able to carry out educational and
charity activities like the Islamists, the secularist activists were unable to mobilize
residents on a sustained basis. They were unwilling to situate their message within local
cultural norms that they associated with the “Other” Istanbul, despite living in Ümraniye
themselves. Their elitism eventually brought about a lack of rapport with the
neighborhood women… (White, 2002; p. 242)
Moreover, Islamist women in Tunisia were highly engaged. While Ennahda men were
imprisoned during the Ben Ali era, women in the Tunisian Ennahda party developed political
skills and were heads of their households (Wolf, 2015; Marks, 2011). As a result, women
remained active in the Ennahda party after 2011. When the party was legalized after the
revolution, it found a widespread base of public sympathy and grass-roots support and a
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politically-conscious membership. This involvement of female members and the party’s practice
of maintaining relatively more gender conservative norms of sex segregation while reaching out
to other women at the grassroots leads us to expect that the more Islamist women are elected, the
more likely women in their districts will be to interact with and request services from
parliamentarians.

Hypotheses
Accordingly, we expect that Islamist members will use direct methods such as social
gatherings, phone or email, or party and personal district offices more than non-Islamists
deputies (H1) and that female Islamist legislators will be even more likely to use these methods
than legislators with other identities (H2).

Contact methods hypotheses:
H1: Islamist parties will be more likely to use direct methods of contact with citizens than will
non-Islamist legislators.
H2: Female Islamist members will be more likely to use direct methods of contact with citizens
than will female non-Islamist, male non-Islamists, and male Islamist legislators.

A theory of homosocial capital suggests that women’s symbolic and service
responsiveness will improve as more women are elected since female members are more likely
to have more female citizens in their network than their male counterparts (H3). We also expect
that the higher the proportion of seats in the district held by Islamists, the greater will be
women’s symbolic and service responsiveness (H4). In addition, due to this gendered strategy,

Do Islamist Parties Help or Hinder? 17
we hypothesize that as the proportion of Islamist female deputies increases, symbolic and service
responsiveness of women will also improve (H5).

Service and symbolic responsiveness hypotheses:
H3: Female citizens in districts with a higher proportion of female legislators will be more likely
to know about, interact with, and contact legislators than those with a lower proportion of female
legislators.

H4: Female citizens in districts with a higher proportion of Islamist legislators will be more
likely to know about, interact with, and contact legislators than those with a lower proportion of
Islamist legislators.

H5: Female citizens in districts with a higher proportion of Islamist female legislators will be
more likely to know about, interact with, and contact legislators than those with a lower
proportion of female Islamist legislators.

Data and Methods
We test these hypotheses with a survey of legislators and citizens in Tunisia.
Parliamentarian Survey
To compare the use of direct methods to contact constituents used by female, Islamist,
and female Islamist parliamentarians (H1 and H2), we draw on an original 2012 survey of 40 of
the 217 Tunisian Constituent Assembly members elected on October 23, 2011 (Abdel-Samad
2012). We used the following item: “How do you communicate with your district constituents?
Do you:: (a) Have an office in the district, b) Use the office of the party, c) Email them, d) Call
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them by phone, e) Use the media, f) social events (e.g., weddings, funerals), g) Other.” We code
all methods as direct, apart from the media, which we code as indirect.
The parliamentarian survey was administered face-to-face in the Constituent Assembly in
2012 using paper-and-pencil interviewing (PAPI) by a trained Tunisian researcher. All members
of the Assembly were included in the sample. The response rate was 18% and the survey
represented all political parties and independents.
Citizen Survey
To test the impact of parliamentarian gender and party identification on symbolic and
service responsiveness to women (H3, H4, and H5), we draw on data from the 2012 Tunisian
Post-Election Survey (TPES), a nationally-representative study of 1,200 Tunisians 18 years and
older conducted by one of the authors in sixteen electoral districts October-November 2012, one
year after the country’s 2011 Constituent Assembly elections (Benstead & Lust, 2012). 8
To measure service responsiveness, respondents were asked whether they had requested
help from a member of the Constituent Assembly since 2011. Symbolic responsiveness is

8

A multi-stage, probabilistic sampling design was used. A random stratified sample of 12 of 27

electoral districts was selected, with region as stratum. Probability proportional to size (PPS)
sampling was used to select 54 mu’tadiyat (urban communes) and 20 immadayat (rural
communes), according to the distribution of the urban and rural population in the country. Block
size was 15. Systematic methods were used to select a starting address, a random start and walk
were used to choose households, and Kish tables were used to select one ault/ household.
Interviewers conducted surveys with selected respondents regardless of sex. The response rate
was 56%.
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measured by two items tapping whether citizens knew the name of or interacted with
parliamentarians.

Tunisian Parliamentarian Survey
Data from the Tunisian parliamentarian survey (Abdel-Samad, 2012) support our
theoretical expectations that Islamist deputies use direct modes of citizen contact more than nonIslamist members (H1) (Table 2). Such direct interactions build stronger relationships with
constituents which in turn improves the party’s reputation among potential voters and allows
them to reach a broader swath of citizens, including groups that are traditionally marginalized
from political networks. This evidence allows us to partially—if imperfectly—demonstrate that
Islamist parties institutionalize their constituency relations and provide services to the
marginalized through direct methods of interaction and communication.
With the exception of personal district offices, more Islamist deputies use direct forms of
contact (i.e., party office, email, phone, and social events) than non-Islamist deputies. Forty-six
percent of Ennahda deputies use party offices, compared to only 22% of other parties’ deputies,
who are more likely to use personal offices (15% of non-Islamist and 8% of Islamist deputies).
Sixty-one percent of Ennahda deputies use email, compared to only 48% of MPs from other
parties. When it comes to social events, 54% of Ennahda legislators attend these events
compared with 33% of other parties. These direct modes and use of party offices are consistent
with our expectations (H1) and are likely to increase the impact of electing Islamist deputies on
women’s symbolic and service responsiveness. In contrast, deputies from other parties (44%) use
media more than Ennahda members (15%), illustrating what the literature suggests about how
Islamist parties are closer to the grassroots.
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[Table 2]

Table 2. Modes of citizen-legislator contact
Direct contact
Personal
district office

Party
office

Email

Indirect
contact

Phone

Social
events

Media

Islamist versus non-Islamist
Ennahda members

1(8%)

6(46%)

8(62%)

11(85%)

7(54%)

2(15%)

Non-Islamist
members

4(15%)

6(22%)

13(48%)

20(74%)

9(33%)

12(44%)

Female Islamist
members

0(0%)

0(0%)

3(60%)

4(80%)

4(80%)

0(0%)

Male Islamist

0(0%)

6(75%)

4(80%)

7(88%)

3(38%)

2(25%)

Female non-Islamist
members

2(50%)

0(0%)

2(67%)

3(100%)

0(0%)

2(67%)

Male non-Islamist
members

3(13%)

5(21%)

12(50%)

17(71%)

13(54%)

8(33%)

Intersectional categories

Source: Tunisian Constituent Assembly Survey. *N=40. Too small to detect statistically
significant differences.
Female Islamist legislators also differ from even their male Islamist colleagues in their
use of direct use of some direct methods (H2). Just as the literature on Islamist parties argues,
Islamist females use social events more than any other type of deputy: 80% of female Islamist
members, 54% of male non-Islamist members, 38% of male Islamist deputies, and 0% of female
non-Islamist deputies do so. Female Islamist members use different modes from even their
female non-Islamist colleagues, 0% of whom report using social events, which is consistent with
the literature (White 2002) and our expectations. These events allow female Islamist legislators
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to interact with female constituents. When women constituents are in a separate space, they feel
more at ease to engage with female legislators in the absence of patriarchal hierarchy. In
addition, such events provide a higher level of accountability for constituents. When a legislator
promises to help constituents in such events, there are witnesses to the interactions which may
create social pressure for the legislator to act in order to prevent their reputation from suffering.
These events also increase the depth of the relationship between constituents and legislators,
which improves female legislators’ reelection chances. And, they may explain why electing
Islamist female members in Tunisia appears to have a slight negative impact on men’s ability to
ask for services.
At the same time, Islamist females do not use indirect methods, which may be due to the
lack of representation of veiled women on Tunisian television: 0% of female Islamist members,
33% of male non-Islamist members, 25% of male Islamist deputies, and 67% of female nonIslamist deputies.

Tunisian Constituent Survey
Data from the citizen survey (Benstead & Lust, 2012) also support our hypotheses. Even
though Tunisia is the most gender-progressive country in the region, women are much less likely
than men to interact with parliamentarians (Table 3). The gap is largest for public places, such as
cafes or mosques; 30% of men and 13% of women saw a member of the Constituent Assembly
in a public place (p<.001), a substantial gender gap of 17% which highlights male citizens’
advantages accumulating homosocial capital in the political sphere. There is also a large gender
gap for seeing deputies at meetings: 16% of men and 5% of women saw a deputy in this way
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(p<.001), an 11% gap. For interactions that are more open to all citizens—hearing a deputy on
TV of the radio—the gender gap is smaller: 66% of men and 60% of women, (p<.05), a 6% gap.
[Table 3]

Table 3. Constituent-parliamentarian interactions in Tunisia, by citizen gender
Transitional Tunisia (2011-2012)
Saw deputy:

In a public place

Male

Female

Total

Gender
gap
(Male%female%)

183(30.4%)

77(13.0%)

260(21.8%)

17.4%

127(10.6%)

10.7%

747(62.7%)

6.3%

60(5.0%)

3.3%

48(4.0%)

3.3%

37(3.1%)

2.2%

23(1.9%)

1.5%

χ2(1)=52.21***
At meeting

96(15.9%)

31(5.2%)

χ2(1)=36.37***
On TV or heard on radio1

394(65.8%)

353(59.5%)

χ2(1)=4.97*
Heard about deputy second hand

40(6.7%)

20(3.4%)

χ2(1)=6.99**
In his/her home or local office

34(5.7%)

14(2.4%)

χ2(1)=8.47**
Deputy is a friend/family member

25(4.2%)

12(2.0%)

χ2(1)=4.56*
At party office

16(2.7%)

7(1.2%)

χ2(1)=3.51†
Source: 2012 TPES. †p<.10/*p<.05/**p<.01/***p<.001. 1Not included in dependent variable.

In relative terms, other less common interactions show larger gaps. Although gender gaps
are 3% or less, men were twice as likely as women to have heard about a deputy or visited an
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office. The same is true for having a parliamentarian as a friend or family member; 6% compared
to 2% saw a deputy in his or her home or office (p<.01), a 4% gap.
Dependent Variable
To measure symbolic and service responsiveness, we create three binary dependent
variables (yes=1, no=0) indicating whether the individual: (1) knows the name of at least one
parliamentarian from the district (symbolic responsiveness); (2) has interacted with a member in
at least one way (Table 3; symbolic responsiveness); and, (3) has asked for help with a personal
or community problem or to express an opinion (service responsiveness).
Figure 1 shows the percentage of male and female citizens who have done these things.
Men are more than twice as likely as women to interact with a deputy: 39% of men and 18% of
women have seen a deputy in at least one of six ways, while 32% of men and 19% of women
know the name of at least one parliamentarian. Few citizens (4% of men and 6% of women) have
asked for services. As noted, gender gaps in these outcomes also exist in Morocco, Algeria,
Libya, and Jordan (Benstead, 2019b).
[Figure 1]
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Figure 1. Symbolic and service responsiveness, by citizen gender (Dependent variables)
45
39

40
35

32

30
25
20

19

18

15
10
4

-

5
0

Knows name (Gender gap of 13%,
p<.00)

6

Interacted with (Gender gap of 21%, Asked for help (Reverse gender gap
p<.00)
of -2%, p<.12)
■ Male citizens

■ Female citizens

2012 TPES (Benstead & Lust, 2012). Knows name: “Please name for me deputies currently
elected to the Constituent Assembly from (electoral constituency)?” Interacted with: “Have you
ever: (1) Attended a meeting where a Deputy from this district appeared?” (2) “Seen any Deputy
from this district in a public place such as in the street, a cafe, or a mosque?” (3) “Visited or seen
the local office or home of a deputy from this district?” (4) “Visited any Deputy from this district
in their party office?” (5) “Heard about any Deputies from this district second hand?” (6) “Is a
Deputy from this district simply a friend or family member and that is how you recognize their
name?” Asked for help: “How many times have you or any member of your household living
here tried to contact a current member of the Constituent Assembly—that is someone elected
October 23, 2011—to seek help with a personal problem, a social, or economic problem your
community is facing, or to express an opinion?”
Independent Variables
Since Tunisia has a closed-list proportional representation system and our theory suggests
that members’ Islamic identity and gender shape service and symbolic responsiveness to women,
we include measures of the percentage of seats in the district held by women (H3: Homosociality
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hypothesis), Islamist parliamentarians, and Islamist female deputies (H4 and H5: Islamist
mandate hypotheses). The percentage of seats held by women in the district ranges from 13-57%
in the 16 of the 24 districts in the survey (Table 4). The percentage of seats/district held by
Islamist deputies ranges from 25-56%, while the percentage of seats held by Islamist female
deputies in the district from 33-75%.

[Table 4]

Table 4. Explanatory variables in sixteen districts
a. District
b. Female
c. Ennahda parliamentarians
d. Ennahda female
(District
parliamentarians (all
(all sexes) (H2)
parliamentarians
Magnitude)
parties) (H1)
(H3)
Ben Arous
(5) 50.0%
(4) 40.0%
(2) 20.0%
(10)
Bizerte (9)
(3) 33.3%
(4) 44.4%
(2) 22.22.0%
Mednine (9)
(3) 33.3%
(5) 55.6%
(2) 22.22.0%
Sidi Bouzid
(3) 37.5%
(2) 25.0%
(1) 12.5.0%
(8)
Sfax 1 (7)
(3) 42.9%
(3) 42.9%
(2) 28.57%
Sousse (10)
(3) 30.0%
(4) 40.0%
(2) 20.0%
Tunis 1 (9)
(3) 33.33%
(4) 44.4%
(2) 33.33%
Tunis 2 (8)
(3) 37.5%
(3) 37.5%
(2) 22.22%
Beja (6)
(1) 16.67%
(2) 33.3%
(1) 16.67%
Gafsa (7)
(1) 14.3%
(3) 42.9%
(1) 14.28%
Mahdia (8)
(2) 25.0%
(3) 37.5%
(1) 12.5%
Manouba (7)
(1) 14.3%
(3) 42.9%
(1) 14.28%
Ariana (8)
(1) 12.5%
(3) 37.5%
(1) 12.5%
Nabeul 1 (7)
(4) 57.1%
(2) 28.5%
(1) 14.28%
Nabeul 2 (6)
(3) 50.0%
(2) 33.3%
(1) 16.67%
Sfax 2 (9)
(2) 22.22%
(4) 44.4%
(2) 22.22%
Table 3 shows the total number of seats in the electoral district (a) and the number of female,
Islamist, and female Islamist MPs (b-d). Note that columns b-d do not sum to the district
magnitude in column a.
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We control for the developmental level of the electoral district, measured as the
percentage of homes with tap water, ranging from 50 to 100% (National Institute of Statistics,
2014; Table 5). We also control for district magnitude, ranging from 6-10 seats, and the
proportion of respondents who report co-tribal identity as a factor in their parliamentary vote
choice, ranging from 8 to 65% and is based on the TPES survey. Both variables could
systematically impact the likelihood that different types of candidates would be placed on lists
and elected and are included in similar studies (Benstead, 2016). Benstead (2015) finds higher
proportions of citizen parliamentary linkages mediated by tribal connections increase women’s
ability to ask for services due to homophily—shared identity based on an intersecting identity
trait, in this case, tribe. 9
We also control for several individual-level factors, including age in years,
socioeconomic status, urban residence, education, religiosity, attitudes about gender equality,
and preference for secular parties, which can affect the likelihood that Ennahda was elected in
the first place (Table 4). Socioeconomic status is measured as self-identified class and ranges
from lower=1 to upper=5 class. Urban residence is measured according to whether the interview
is located in an urban (mutadiya=1) or rural (immada=0) commune. Education is measured in
four categories: no schooling=1, primary=2, secondary=3, and college or above=4. Religiosity is
measured on a scale of 1 (someone who never prays, goes to mosque, or reads/listens to religious
9

It was not possible to estimate the model due to limited n when this variable was measured at

the individual-level. However, removing it from the regression also affected the coefficients on
Islamist female members. Thus, we have included it, but believe that it is important to study
further the relationships between Islamist parties, female members, and use of tribal and other
clientelistic linkages.
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materials) and 5 as someone who often does. To measure preference for a secular party, we use a
nine-point scale of preferences for a completely religious=1or secular=9 party. Higher support
for gender equality is measured as whether a respondent is more likely to live in an area where
women are elected or to know a female personally, we use whether the respondent believes the
proportion of women in office should decrease=1, stay the same=2, or increase=3.
[Table 5]

Table 5. Question wording for independent variables
Individual-level variables
Higher age: “What is your age?” (years)
Higher class: “What class do you belong to? Lower=1, lower middle=2, middle=3, upper
middle=4, and upper=5.”
Urban: Census designation.
Higher education: ”What is your highest level of education? 1=None, 2=primary,
3=secondary, high or technical school, and 4=university or above.”
Higher religiosity: “On a scale of 1-5 which number better represents you if 5 means a
person who goes to houses of worship daily, takes religious lessons, listens to religious
programs and reads religious books, while the number 1 means a person who rarely does
these things?”
Prefers secular party: “On a scale of 1 to 9, please state your personal preferences on the
positions below. Prefer a: Religious party=1 or Secular party=9.”
Higher support for gender equality: “As you may know, there are presently 58 women
elected to the Constituent Assembly (27%). In your opinion, would it be best if this level
were to decrease=1, increase=3, or stay the same=2?”
District-level variables
Higher development: Percentage homes with tap water.
District magnitude: 6-10 seats
Greater tribal/family vote: “For each of the following, please tell me whether it is a factor
when you consider which party or candidate to vote for in parliamentary elections? List
contained a candidate endorsed by your family or tribe.” Mean for electoral district.
Source: All variables from the TPES, except for higher development, which comes from the National
Institute of Statistics (2014).

Results and Discussion
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Drawing on the Tunisian constituent survey, we test the impact of female, Islamist, and
female Islamist deputies on women’s symbolic and service responsiveness. We use logistic
regression with cluster robust standard errors and run separate models for male and female
citizens. 10
We find strong support for our hypotheses. As shown in Model 1 (Table 6 and 9), as the
proportion of women elected in the district increases, so does the likelihood that a woman in that
district knows the name of a deputy, in support of the homosociality hypothesis (H3). A woman
living in the district with the highest proportion of women (57%, Beja) is 26% more likely to
know the name of a deputy than a woman living in the district with the fewest females elected
(13%, Tunis 1, p<.001). Controlling for individual and district-level factors, women are more
likely to know the name of a deputy if they are from a higher social class (p<.05) and have a
higher education (p<.05). When all other variables are their median, a woman from the upper
class is 32% more likely to know a deputy’s name than a less advantaged woman. A woman with
a university education or greater is 24% more likely to know the name of a deputy than a woman
without education.
[Table 6]

10

Sixteen groups is too small to justify a multi-level model. A mixed effects model obtained the

same substantive conclusions. Thus we report the simpler, logistic regression model.
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Table 6. Determinants of symbolic responsiveness (knowing member’s name)
Model
Independent variables

Individual-level
Higher age
Higher class
Urban
Higher education
Higher religiosity
Prefers secular party
Supports gender equality
District-level
Higher district magnitude
Higher % female members
Higher % Islamist members
Higher % Islamist women
Higher development
Greater tribal/family vote
Constant
N
χ2
†

Pseudo R2

Model 1
Female citizens
Logistic
Marginal effects1
coefficients
(Predicted
probabilities)

Model 2
Male citizens
Logistic
Marginal effects1
coefficients
(Predicted
probabilities)

.003(.008)
.421(.138)*
.046(.351)
.392(.140)*
-.199(.134)
.021(.045)
.094(.220)

.000(.001)
.064(.022)*
.007(.053)
.060(.020)*
-.030(.020)
.003(.007)
.014(.033)

-.000(.004)
.333(.115)*
-.582(.298)*
.514(.105)***
.025(.085)
.025(.040)
-.088(.136)

-.000(.001)
.064(.028)*
-.126(.062)*
.100(.023)***
.005(.016)
.005(.007)
-.017(.028)

.138(.220)
.040(.010)***
.051(.023)*
.026(.010)*
-.041(.004)***
-.025(.010)**
-4.944(2.172)*

.021(.014)
.006(.001)***
.008(.003)*
.004(.001)**
-.006(.001)***
-.004(.001)*

.083(.139)
-.004(.018)
-.004(.046)
-.013(.018)
-.016(.001)
-.026(.017)
-.400(3.433)

.016(.027)
-.001(.004)
-.001(.009)
-.003(.004)
-.003(.002)
-.005(.003)†

452
(13)=754.89**
*
.1510

483
(13)=79.09***
.0633

p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 1 ∂y/∂x for
variable means, change of dummy variables from 0-1. Reference group: Respondent with median
level on all independent variables.

Model 1 also shows that electing more Islamists and Islamist women improves symbolic
responsiveness to women. In support of H4, a woman living in the district with the highest
proportion of Islamist deputies (56%, Mednine) is 25% more likely to know a deputy’s name
than a woman living in the district with the lowest proportion (25%, Sidi Bouzid, p<.01). In
support of H5, a woman living in the district with the highest proportion of Islamist female
deputies (75%, Tunis 1) is 17% more likely to know a name than a woman living in the district
with the lowest (33%, Ariana, Manouba, Mahdia, and Gafsa, p<.01). Contrary to conventional
wisdom, increasing the representation of a grassroots party like Ennahda improves women’s
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symbolic responsiveness as much as electing women from any party. In contrast, Model 2 shows
that electing parliamentarians with different traits does not affect men’s interaction with
members. We expect this to be the case because while male MPs tend to have homosocial
networks, female members have heterosocial networks, due to the need to mobilize support from
women and men. 11 Among men, only higher class (p<.05), rural residence (p<.05), and higher
education (p<.001) increases the likelihood of knowing a parliamentarian’s name.
Model 3 supports the gendered Islamic mandate hypothesis (H5). As the proportion of
female Islamists increases, so does the probability of interactions between female citizens and
parliamentarians (Table 7). A woman living in the district with the highest proportion of Islamist
female deputies (75%, Tunis 1) is 13% more likely to interact with a deputy than a woman living
in the district with the lowest proportion (33%, Ariana, Manouba, Mahdia, and Gafsa, p<.10).
More educated women are 11% more likely to interact with deputies in at least one way when
comparing the most and least educated women (p<.001). Yet for male citizens, a higher
proportion of Islamist women elected decreases the likelihood of interacting with deputies
(Model 4). This suggests that female Islamist deputies are engaged in sex-gendered constituent
interactions involving direct contact methods like social events. A male living in the district with
the highest proportion of Islamist female deputies (75%, Tunis 1) is 21% less likely to interact
with a deputy than a woman living in the district with the lowest proportion of Islamist females
elected (33%, Ariana, Manouba, Mahdia, and Gafsa, p<.001). Education increases the likelihood
of having interacted with a deputy (p<.001) by 45% when comparing men with no education to
one with a university education.
[Table 7]
11

This work did not distinguish Islamist and non-Islamist MPs.
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Table 7. Determinants of symbolic responsiveness (interacting with a member)
Model
Independent variables

Individual-level
Higher age
Higher class
Urban
Higher education
Higher religiosity
Prefers secular party
Supports gender equality
District-level
Higher district magnitude
Higher % female members
Higher % Islamist members
Higher % Islamist female
Higher development
Greater tribal/family vote
Constant
N
χ2
Pseudo R2

†

Model 3
Female citizens
Logistic
Marginal effects1
coefficients
(Predicted
probabilities)

Model 4
Male citizens
Logistic
Marginal
coefficients
effects1
(Predicted
probabilities)

-.004(.009)
.373(.237)***
.707(.398)†
.496(.129)***
-.004(.121)
.033(.041)
.225(.217)

-.001(.002)*
.062(.037)*
.095(.049)†
.083(.023)***
-.001(.020)
.006(.007)
.034(.036)

-.000(.005)
.218(.180)
-.145(.370)
.489(.133)***
.019(.073)
.039(.028)
.270(.168)

-.000(.001)
.050(.042)
-.034(.087)
.112(.027)***
.004(.017)
.009(.006)
.062(.038)

.040(.114)
.011(.011)
-.010(.016)
.015(.008)†
.008(.008)
-.016(.013)
6.315(1.850)***

.007(.019)
.002(.002)
-.002(.003)
.003(.002)†
.001(.001)
-.003(.002)

.005(.082)
-.002(.006)
-.001(.017)
-.021(.005)***
.022(.003)***
-.004(.005)
3.976(1.063)***

-.001(.120)
-.000(.001)
-.000(.004)
-.005(.001)***
.005(.001)***
-.001(.001)

451
(13)=57.82***
.0865

483
(13)=670.49***
.0713

p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 1 ∂y/∂x for
variable means, change of dummy variables from 0-1.

When considering the factors that explain the probability of having asked a
parliamentarian for help with a service, the data support the homosociality (H3) and Islamic
mandate effect hypotheses (H4-H5, Table 8). As shown in Model 5, as the proportion of women
elected in the district increases, so does the service responsiveness of women living there
(p<.10). A woman living in the district with the highest proportion of women (57%, Beja) is 9%
more likely to know the name of a deputy than a woman living in the district with the lowest
proportion (13%, Tunis 1, p<.05). Moreover, as the proportion of Islamist deputies increases, so
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does the likelihood that female citizens will as for help with a service (p<.05). When comparing
the district with highest proportion of Islamists deputies (56%) to that with the lowest (25%), the
likelihood that a woman will have asked a deputy for help increases by 6% (p<.01). And, the
greater the proportion of female Islamist deputies is related to a greater likelihood of women
asking for help from a parliamentarian (p<.05). A woman living in the district with the highest
proportion of Islamist female deputies (75%, Tunis 1) is 13% more likely to ask a deputy for
help than a woman living in the district with the lowest proportion (33%, Ariana, Manouba,
Mahdia, and Gafsa, p<.05). Higher age (p<.001), lower class (p<.001), and urban residence
(p<.01) predict a higher likelihood of women contacting a deputy (Table 8). 12
Among male citizens (Model 6), the proportion of female, Islamist, or Islamist female
deputies elected does not affect the ability to ask for services. Lower class (p<.001), urban
residence (p<.10), and lower developmental levels (p<.10) increase men’s service
responsiveness.

[Table 8]

Table 8. Determinants of service responsiveness (contacting a member)
Model
Independent variables

Individual-level
Higher age
Higher class
12

Model 5
Female citizens
Logistic
Marginal effects1
coefficients
(Predicted
probabilities)
.04(.001)***
-1.066(.178)***

.002(.001)**
-.047(.013)***

Model 6
Male citizens
Logistic
Marginal
coefficients
effects1
(Predicted
probabilities)
-.008(.017)
-1.228(.333)***

-.000(.000)
-.032(.013)*

Although we asked whether the respondent was satisfied with the result, the number of cases

of service requests was insufficient for multivariate regression.

Do Islamist Parties Help or Hinder? 33
Urban
Higher education
Higher religiosity
Prefers secular party
Supports gender equality
District-level
Higher district magnitude
Higher % female members
Higher % Islamist members
Higher % Islamist female
Higher development
Greater tribal/family vote
Constant

3.039(1.081)**
.292(.285)
.128(.161)
.005(.144)
.004(.427)

.044(.014)***
.013(.013)
.006(.007)
.000(.006)
.000(.019)

1.039(.585)†
.150(.499)
.515(.369)
.004(.080)
-.022(.380)

.017(.010)†
.004(.008)
.014(.008)
.000(.002)
-.001(.010)

.511(.272)†
.050(.030)
.057(.026)*
.073(.036)*
-.005(.007)
.002(.031)
-17.013(5.397)**

.022(.013)†
.002(.001)*
.002(.001)**
.003(.002)*
-.000(.000)
.000(.001)

-.073(.260)
.010(.025)
.007(.038)
.009(.018)
-.026(.014)†
.041(.028)
-2.216(4.428)

-.002(.007)
.000(.001)
.000(.001)
.000(.001)
-.001(.000)*
.001(.001)

N
437
470
χ2
(13)=1061.62***
(13)=365.92***
Pseudo R2
.2401
.1548
†
p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 1 ∂y/∂x for variable
means, change of dummy variables from 0-1.

Table 9 summarizes the results of the multivariate analyses. The models show that
symbolic and service responsiveness to women improves the more women, regardless of party,
are elected in a district (Homosociality hypothesis, H3). So too, as the proportion of Islamist
deputies increases, regardless of the member’s gender, so does the likelihood that women in that
district will know the name of a deputy and have contacted a deputy (Islamist mandate effect:
Party component, H4). Electing female Islamists also positively impacts responsiveness to
women on these measures (Islamist mandate effect: Gender component, H5). Yet, it also has an
impact on the likelihood that men will interact with deputies. The more Islamist females are
elected in a district, the less likely male citizens will be to interact in public and private spaces
with members.
[Table 9]

Table 9. Summary of results: Marginal effects and maximum effect size

Do Islamist Parties Help or Hinder? 34
Knowing name
(Symbolic
responsiveness)

Marginal effect for a 1%
increase in district’s female
members
Maximum effect
(comparing district with the
lowest % female members
to the district with the
highest % female members)
Marginal effect for a 1%
increase in district’s
Islamist members
Maximum effect
(comparing district with the
lowest % Islamist members
to the district with the
highest % Islamist
members)

Model 1

Model 2

Interacting with a
member
(Symbolic
responsiveness)
Model 3
Model 4

Female
citizens
.6%***

Male
citizens

Female
citizens

Male
citizens

Not
significant

Not
significant

Not
significant

Not
significant

Not
significant

Not
significant

26.4%

.8%*
24.8%

Contacting a
member
(Service
responsiveness)
Model 5
Model 6
Female
citizens
.2%*
8.8%

.2%**
6.2%

Male
citizens
Not
significant

Not
significant

Marginal effect for a 1%
.4%**
.3%†
-.5%***
.3%*
increase in district’s female
Not
Not
Islamist members
significant
significant
Maximum effect
16.8%
12.6%
21.0%
12.6%
(comparing district with the
lowest % Islamist female
members to the district with
the highest % Islamist
female members)
†
p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. Reference group:
Respondent with median level on all independent variables. Table 8 summarizes the significant results
and the maximum effect size for the results of the 2011 Constituent Assembly election.

Once these three explanatory variables are taken into account, there is no pattern across

models in the impact of citizens’ urban residence, higher class, or higher education or any other
factors on their likelihood of symbolic or service responsiveness.

Conclusions and Implications
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Our study is the first in a Muslim context to examine the intersectional effect of deputy
gender and party identification on women’s service and symbolic responsiveness (Crenshaw,
1991). It draws attention to substantial gaps in women’s access to public space, which diminishes
responsiveness to women’s policy priorities (Kudva, 2003) and likely also their political
participation (Benstead & Lust, 2015; Bernick & Ciftci, 2014).
We find strong evidence that electing women improves symbolic and service
responsiveness to women in Tunisia, consistently with research in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya
(Benstead, 2016) and our expectations (H3). When comparing the district with the largest
proportion of women elected to the one with the smallest proportion, women are 26% more
likely to know the name of a deputy and 9% more likely to have contacted a deputy. This
suggests that the Tunisian transitional period is not exceptional with regard to the impact of
legislator identity on women’s representation. Rather, electing women affects women’s symbolic
and service responsiveness across Arab countries with different quota laws, political contexts,
and degrees of electoral competitiveness, including in Morocco and Algeria (Benstead, 2016;
2019).
Electing women has the largest impact on women’s symbolic and service responsiveness,
but electing Islamists also increases these outcomes (H4). When comparing the district with the
highest proportion of Islamist deputies to the one with the lowest, women are 25% more likely to
know the name of a deputy and 6% more likely to have contacted a member. This finding is
striking, given that the factors that should increase the likelihood of Islamists being elected,
including more conservative social values and religiosity (Wegner, 2017), should also be
correlated with less interaction between women and elected officials. Yet, this was not the case.
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Electing female Islamists improves symbolic and service responsiveness to women while
reducing symbolic responsiveness to men. When comparing the district with the largest
proportion of Islamist females to the smallest, men are 21% less likely to have interacted with a
member of parliament. In support of H5, this suggests that female Islamists’ strategies and
practices to reach out to women, often in sex-segregated environments, actually reduce access
for men. This runs counter to some work (Benstead, 2019b), which shows that women leaders
tend to have heterosocial networks and, therefore, that increasing electing women does not
inhibit men’s representation.
It is possible that these findings are unique to Tunisia. After all, parties are stronger in
Tunisia than in many other MENA countries (Buehler, 2018). Tunisia’s unique state formation
process under the Ottomans and the French weakened tribal networks more than other MENA
countries (Anderson, 1986; Charrad, 2001), leading parties to stand in for familial networks. This
process continued under Bourghiba (Moore, 1965) and Ben Ali, when the ruling RCD party
became a major source of nepotism and rent distribution (Hibou, 2011).
Yet the findings suggest that Islamist parties similarly shape women’s representation in a
variety of contexts, regardless of the strength of party-citizen linkages. For instance, Benstead
(2021) finds using a survey of 112 Moroccan Members of Parliament (MPs) that female
legislators and Islamist deputies are more likely to interact with female citizens than male
parliamentarians from non-Islamist parties. And in Algeria, Islamists’ more institutionalized
constituency service practices allow them to reach a wider range of citizens they do not
personally know and who are more likely to be marginalized from patronage networks (e.g.,
women).
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What is common about all of these contexts is the clientelistic context in which Islamist
parties operate (Masoud, 2014). Our findings are thus likely broadly applicable to clientelistic
societies in the Muslim world—wherever marginalized populations, such as women, increase
their representation and parties adopt more democratically-oriented practices (Cavatorta &
Merone, 2013). Nevertheless, this must be tested, and a comparative framework is needed.
Because Tunisia is one of the region’s most gender-equal societies (Charrad, 2001), we expect
the impact of electing Islamist and non-Islamist female deputies to have a greater impact on
improving women’s symbolic and service responsiveness in other Arab societies. Moreover, we
have tested our theory on only two interrelated outcomes: interactions with members and
approaching them for help. Future research should also broaden the outcome variables to
consider different measures of symbolic, service, and substantive responsiveness to women, such
as how the intersection of candidate gender and Islamist orientation affects citizens’ willingness
to share their opinions, which we address only tangentially in this paper. 13 Since patriarchy is a
multi-dimensional concept (Benstead, 2016), electing Islamist parties could have a positive
impact on indicators of responsiveness but not others. It is crucial to remember that Islamist
parties may increase women’s interaction with legislators as part of an electoral strategy while
13

Bush and Prather (2018) found that men and women were more likely to be primed to share

their views on legislation when primed to think of legislators as female than as a mixed group,
but did not distinguish between Islamist and non-Islamist deputies. Substantive representation
has been studied mainly in democracies and thus defined as, “advancing women’s interests
through…policy making” (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; p. 104; Franceschet, Lena Krook, & Piscopo,
2012). Benstead (2019b) argues that substantive representation should also include service and
allocation responsiveness (Eulau & Karps, 1977).
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reinforcing conservative gender norms. We also need to know more about whether Christian,
Hindu, or other religious parties also use similar strategies and what the impacts are for women’s
representation.
Our findings have important implications for gender and governance research. They
suggest that gender quotas impact women’s symbolic and service responsiveness, both through
electing women from across the party spectrum, as well as by electing Islamist women. This
provides additional evidence that women are not a monolithic group (Hughes, 2011), but rather
that women with different intersecting traits can differently impact responsiveness to women.
And it adds to existing literature which finds mixed evidence that increasing women’s political
representation in Africa and Latin America improves women’s symbolic responsiveness and
political engagement (Barnes & Burchard, 2012; Zetterberg, 2009).
The findings also extend working on gender and government by showing that less
clientelistic parties improve responsiveness to women. Islamist parties do not completely reject
clientelistic practices, but, when it comes to service provision, they are more internallydemocratic than other parties. This positively impacts marginalized groups, including women.
Some scholars see electing women as a tool to achieve both women’s empowerment and reduce
corruption (Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Rivas, 2013). Our findings
suggest democratization and party development are pathways to greater corruption control and
gender equality (Sung, 2003). Moreover, it offers insights for understanding why Islamist parties
are electorally successful (Masoud, 2014; Brooke, 2019).
Future surveys should include questions on citizens’ interactions with parliamentarians,
and, if possible, surveys of parliamentarians should also be conducted in other countries beyond
the MENA region. In critical Muslim-majority cases like Egypt, this is impossible, due to the
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banning and repression of the Muslim Brotherhood. It should also consider different types of
Islamist parties, including those that are more authoritarian and seek to establish a theocratic
state, as these movements may impact women differently, and look at party directorates and
party members’ service provision, not only that of parliamentarians and collaboration between
women and men. Future studies should also assess other intersecting identities of parliamentarian
and citizen identity, such as ethnicity, and class and look more closely at the extent to which
women and men helped by Islamist and other parties are those who supported them in elections,
helping to better understand the extent to which Islamist parties spurn clientelism all together or
merely create new patronage networks. Through these extensions, scholars will have a better
understanding of how electoral politics impact responsiveness to women and other marginalized
citizens.
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